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MOORE’S POTENTIAL 
June Carbone* & Naomi Cahn** 
INTRODUCTION 
Underlying the U.S. Supreme Court’s decision in Moore v. City of East 
Cleveland1 are long-term changes in the relationship between the family and 
the state.  These changes upended the reciprocities between the state 
definition of legitimate families and the basis for claims of state recognition 
and support.  Today, in contrast, many view the determination of what 
constitutes a family as a matter of personal self-definition to which the state 
should defer, producing even greater division in the relationship between 
families—however they are defined—and claims to state support. 
These issues have become the subject of an intense culture war.2  On the 
one hand, conservatives continue to view married, gendered, two-parent 
families as essential to societal well-being; thus, they favor traditional family 
values in the public square and the provision of state support to families only 
in the context of shared community values.3  Liberals, in contrast, emphasize 
tolerance in the public square and promote greater state support for all 
children regardless of family structure, viewing it as necessary to realizing 
the promises of equality and participatory citizenship in a democracy.4 
The Supreme Court decided Moore before the modern cultural divide on 
the structure of the family fully took hold; thus, Moore’s various opinions do 
* Robina Chair of Law, Science and Technology, University of Minnesota.  We thank Clare
Huntington, Robin Lenhardt, and all of the participants at the Fordham Law Review Family 
Law Symposium entitled Moore Kinship held at Fordham University School of Law.  For an 
overview of the symposium, see R.A. Lenhardt & Clare Huntington, Foreword:  Moore 
Kinship, 85 FORDHAM L. REV. 2551 (2017). 
**  Harold H. Greene Professor of Law, George Washington University Law School. 
1. 431 U.S. 494 (1977).
2. See NAOMI CAHN & JUNE CARBONE, RED FAMILIES V. BLUE FAMILIES:  LEGAL 
POLARIZATION AND THE CREATION OF CULTURE 1 (2010). 
3. Scholars term this system, which treats gendered, two-parent marriages as critical to
children’s support, as the privatization of dependency. See, e.g., MARTHA ALBERTSON
FINEMAN, THE NEUTERED MOTHER, THE SEXUAL FAMILY AND OTHER TWENTIETH CENTURY 
TRAGEDIES 161–62 (1995). 
4. See June Carbone, “Blue” Morality and the Legitimacy of the State—Ed Rubin’s Soul,
Self, and Society:  The New Morality and the Modern State, LAW & SOC. INQUIRY (Aug. 25, 
2016) (reviewing EDWARD L. RUBIN, SOUL, SELF, AND SOCIETY:  THE NEW MORALITY AND THE
MODERN STATE (2015)), http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/lsi.12223/full 
[https://perma.cc/7AUL-SC6J]. 
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not directly address this culture divide.  Yet, in two critical parts of the 
decision, the Court seemed to have anticipated this culture conflict, 
foreshadowing the tension between the growing desire of individuals to 
define “family” in terms of their own choosing and the state’s power to define 
what constitutes a legitimate family form and, thus, to decide who is entitled 
to state support. 
First, in granting Inez Moore a constitutional right to live with a family 
that included both of her grandchildren, the plurality based its decision on 
tradition, not autonomy.5  At the time, judicial conservatives had not yet 
hijacked tradition as support for constitutional originalism and judicial 
liberals had not yet unequivocally embraced individual choice as a source of 
protection for alternative families.  Thus, Moore is a methodologically 
conservative opinion that celebrates the traditional institution of the family 
through the vehicle of a grandmother-headed extended family.  In this sense, 
Moore has much in common with Obergefell v. Hodges,6 which reconciled 
an alternative family with mainstream institutions.7 
Second, while embracing Moore’s extended family as part of a 
longstanding tradition, Moore only narrowly accords recognition to the 
“traditional family” in this extended family form as entitled to constitutional 
protection.8  Instead, the various opinions saw this particular family structure 
as a fallback option that served as a privatized form of insurance to provide 
for children in times of financial or other family stress.9  Notably, none of the 
opinions discuss the circumstances that led to the grandchildren’s residence 
with their grandmother, other than noting the death of one of the children’s 
mothers.10  Rather, the case honors a worthy individual—a grandmother who 
takes in her multiple grandchildren—without fully exploring the relationship 
between family and economic well-being in the changing American 
landscape.  Thus, while crafting an opinion that does not challenge the 
deference due to land use decisions, the Justices also avoided laying a 
foundation for alternative families to claim state support in either practical or 
doctrinal terms. 
At the time of the decision, single-family zoning restrictions, which might 
not have been controversial in other eras, were emerging as markers of race 
and class and were facing mounting legal challenges.11  Today, studies 
indicate that racially and economically integrated communities tend to 
enhance the well-being and achievement of poor families without 
 
 5. See Moore, 431 U.S. at 504–06. 
 6. 135 S. Ct. 2584 (2015). 
 7. Id. at 2595–96. 
 8. Moore, 431 U.S. at 503–05. 
 9. See id. at 505. 
 10. Id. at 496–97. 
 11. See, e.g., S. Burlington Cty. NAACP v. Township of Mount Laurel, 336 A.2d 713 
(N.J. 1975). 
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undermining those who are better off.12  Yet, local zoning laws, particularly 
when tied to family characteristics, tend to encourage racial and financial 
segregation, compounding the disadvantages of poor communities of color.13  
In particular, these laws give every community an incentive to adopt zoning 
restrictions that attract stable, higher-income families and exclude those 
likely to be poorer, needier, and a drain on community desirability or 
resources.14  In the face of the widespread adoption of such exclusionary 
practices, communities that adopt broader definitions of acceptable 
households may find themselves at a disadvantage in sustaining an 
appropriate mix of households.  Thus, East Cleveland, a heavily African-
American community struggling to maintain its middle-class status, adopted 
the zoning laws at issue in Moore in an effort to stave off a downward cycle 
in the community’s fortunes.15  The opinions in Moore, however, never 
acknowledged this community dynamic at work. 
Part I of this Article briefly explores the culture wars that have consumed 
American politics since Moore.  Part II discusses Moore’s uneasy position 
within the conception of family as a matter of choice versus tradition.  Then, 
to the extent that the Moore Court addressed the changing family, Part III 
shows how it did so by treating the extended family as a manifestation of 
traditional family values, not the newly emerging substantive family values 
that valorize delay in childbearing and financial independence.16  Finally, 
Part IV considers Moore’s missed opportunities to examine the relationship 
between family form, race, and class. 
I.  CULTURE WARS REVISITED 
Scholars routinely describe American politics—and the disputes about 
family values—as a culture war.17  While there is no popularly accepted 
definition of what that culture war is about, it certainly includes differences 
about the source of moral values,18 the increasing ideological identification 
12. See, e.g., Raj Chetty & Nathaniel Hendren, The Impacts of Neighborhoods on
Intergenerational Mobility:  Childhood Exposure Effects and County-Level Estimates 73 
(2015), http://scholar.harvard.edu/files/hendren/files/nbhds_paper.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/UC44-8XCQ]. 
13. See generally J. Peter Byrne, Are the Suburbs Unconstitutional?, 85 GEO. L.J. 2265
(1997). 
14. See id. at 2269 (reviewing CHARLES M. HAAR, SUBURBS UNDER SIEGE:  RACE, SPACE,
AND AUDACIOUS JUDGES (1996), and DAVID L. KIRP ET AL., OUR TOWN:  RACE, HOUSING, AND
THE SOUL OF SUBURBIA (1995)) (describing the social and economic incentives for 
exclusionary zoning as “the political independence of suburban jurisdictions, the near-
complete delegation of zoning power by the state to the locality, the reliance on local taxes to 
fund local government services (particularly education), and national policies facilitating and 
subsidizing suburban development on a scale never undertaken before”). 
15. See Robert A. Burt, The Constitution of the Family, 1979 SUP. CT. REV. 329, 389.
16. The authors term this distinction as red versus blue family values. See generally CAHN
& CARBONE, supra note 2. 
17. See infra notes 18–22.
18. See generally EDWARD L. RUBIN, SOUL, SELF, AND SOCIETY:  THE NEW MORALITY AND
THE MODERN STATE (2015). 
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of American political parties,19 deeply rooted personality differences in 
values orientation,20 differences in forms of expression,21 and the role of the 
family in civic life.22 
However the culture wars are defined, the family has been a central part of 
that dispute, which can be described as a clash between “red” versus “blue” 
family values—or, more generally, as part of a traditionalist versus modernist 
cultural divide.  At the core of the divide are two different worldviews with 
overlapping political and family consequences.  The blue system combines 
“public tolerance with private discipline.”23  In this modernist system, people 
choose individually crafted values, central to self-definition and personal 
self-worth.24  In contrast, the red system advocates public orthodoxy and 
private forgiveness.25  In this traditionalist system, values must be externally 
derived—from God, from authority grounded in tradition, or from human 
nature—to have meaning, and they should accordingly be upheld in the 
public square.26  Repentance, forgiveness, and reconciliation with the 
community occur in private.27 
The differences between these two systems have implications for both 
legal justifications and content.  Blue legal justifications uphold individual 
choice; red justifications look to sources of value outside the individual, such 
as tradition, authority, or community consensus.28  In terms of content, blue 
analysis favors a functional approach that looks at the importance of family 
roles, while red analysis favors time-honored definitions of family 
regularity.29  Thus, blue analysis is less tied to either continuity or 
institutional regularity.30 
Using these differing approaches, one can evaluate the family 
transformations in the latter part of the twentieth century.  Values about 
family form changed from a uniform emphasis on the necessity of 
heterosexual marriage (i.e., the traditionalist red system) to the acceptability 
 
 19. See John T. Jost, The End of the End of Ideology, 61 AM. PSYCHOLOGIST 651, 654 
(2006). 
 20. See DONALD BRAMAN ET AL., CULTURAL COGNITION PROJECT AT YALE LAW SCH., THE 
SECOND NATIONAL RISK AND CULTURE STUDY:  MAKING SENSE OF—AND PROGRESS IN—THE 
AMERICAN CULTURE WAR OF FACT 16 (2007). 
 21. See GEORGE LAKOFF, DON’T THINK OF AN ELEPHANT!:  KNOW YOUR VALUES AND 
FRAME THE DEBATE 1–29 (2014); GEORGE LAKOFF, MORAL POLITICS:  HOW LIBERALS AND 
CONSERVATIVES THINK 143–52 (2d ed. 2002). 
 22. See generally CAHN & CARBONE, supra note 2. 
 23. See id. at 3–4. 
 24. See id. at 44. 
 25. See Carbone, supra note 4, at 4–5. 
 26. See id. 
 27. See id. at 16. 
 28. See id. at 2 n.1. 
 29. See CAHN & CARBONE, supra note 2, at 6–7. 
 30. Compare Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584, 2595 (2015) (plurality opinion) 
(accepting changes over time in the meaning of marriage), with id. at 2612–16 (Roberts, C.J., 
dissenting) (treating marriage as an unchanging, time-honored system). 
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of alternative family forms (i.e., the modernist blue system).31  At the same 
time, the pathways into the middle class changed from shepherding couples 
into early marriages to encouraging lengthy delays in family formation that 
better prepared parents for the responsibilities of family life.32  The process 
of transformation and the conflicts between the two systems exacerbate racial 
and class differences33 and frame the perspectives that underlie Moore. 
II.  CHOICE VERSUS TRADITION AS A SOURCE OF VALUES 
The facts of Moore are straightforward.  Sixty-three-year-old Inez Moore 
shared her home with her adult son, Dale Sr., and her two young 
grandchildren, Dale Jr. and John Jr.34  Six years after John Jr. came to live 
with his grandmother following his mother’s death, the City of East 
Cleveland prosecuted Moore for violating the city’s single-family zoning 
ordinance.35  The Ohio state courts upheld the conviction, but the U.S. 
Supreme Court struck down the ordinance in what should have been a 
relatively easy decision, given the harshness of the impact on a sympathetic 
grandmother.36  Nonetheless, the result sharply divided the Court and 
obscured the case’s broader significance for the legal recognition of families 
and for the interactions among race, class, and family orthodoxy. 
The Supreme Court declared the ordinance unconstitutional on its face but 
only by a vote of five to four and with disagreement among the five Justices 
in the majority on the basis for doing so.  In total, the Justices filed six 
separate opinions.  This part focuses on three of those opinions:  (1) Justice 
John Paul Stevens’s concurring opinion, (2) Justice Lewis Powell’s plurality 
opinion, and (3) Justice Potter Stewart’s dissenting opinion. 
A.  Justice Stevens’s Concurrence 
Writing only for himself, Justice Stevens issued the most far-reaching 
opinion, concurring only in the judgment.37  While his concurrence is viewed 
as idiosyncratic, Stevens may well have anticipated later judicial 
developments in his desire to avoid a publicly imposed definition of family.  
Unlike any of the other Justices, Stevens described the case as one that started 
with Moore’s choice of how to constitute her family.  He thus framed the 
case in terms of the arbitrariness of the ordinance, observing that the “city 
 
 31. See CAHN & CARBONE, supra note 2, at 33–46. 
 32. See id. 
 33. See generally id. 
 34. Moore v. City of East Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494, 496 (1977). 
 35. Id. at 497.  John Jr., who was ten years old by the time the Supreme Court decided the 
case, had lived with his grandmother since his mother died when he was less than a year old, 
and his father, John Sr., apparently lived with the family as well. Id. at 497 n.4; see Brief for 
Appellant at 4, Moore, 431 U.S. 494 (No. 75-6289), 1976 WL 178722, at *4. 
 36. See Moore, 431 U.S. at 507 (Brennan, J., concurring) (“[T]he zoning power is not a 
license for local communities to enact senseless and arbitrary restrictions which cut deeply 
into private areas of protected family life.”). 
 37. See id. at 513–21 (Stevens, J., concurring). 
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has failed totally to explain the need for a rule that would allow a homeowner 
to have two grandchildren live with her if they are brothers but not if they are 
cousins.”38  In emphasizing Moore’s ability to choose her family form, 
however, Stevens faced a dilemma:  if Moore could define family in whatever 
terms she chooses, it would be hard to associate her particular definition of 
family with constitutional protection.  Stevens skirted this issue by according 
Moore constitutional protection as a homeowner, rather than on the basis of 
her family form.39  Stevens wrote that Moore’s interest in her ability to live 
with both grandsons was particularly important with respect to a rule that cuts 
“deeply into a fundamental right normally associated with the ownership of 
residential property—that of an owner to decide who may reside on his or her 
property.”40 
Stevens’s decision not to define the “family” that is entitled to 
constitutional protection encouraged him to take on an issue the other Justices 
in the majority wished to avoid:  the standard of deference due to state zoning 
decisions.41  The Moore dissent, much like the Supreme Court’s 1974 
decision in Village of Belle Terre v. Boraas,42 accorded such ordinances 
substantial deference, requiring only a rational relationship to a permissible 
state objective.43  In contrast, Stevens wrote that, because the ordinance 
ha[d] not been shown to have any “substantial relation to the public health, 
safety, morals, or general welfare” of the city of East Cleveland, and . . . it 
must fall under [this Court’s] limited standard of review of zoning 
decisions[,] . . . East Cleveland’s unprecedented ordinance constitutes a 
taking of property without due process and without just compensation.44 
Such a standard—requiring a showing of a “substantial” rather than a 
“rational” relationship between a zoning regulation and public policy 
concerns—would have substantially increased the scrutiny applicable to local 
zoning ordinances that infringed on property owners’ associational rights.  
By tying his decision to the Takings Clause of the Constitution, Stevens did 
not depend on a particular construction of the constitutional rights accorded 
families.  Instead, Stevens emphasized that the state had a legitimate interest 
in regulating “the identity, as opposed to the number, of persons who may 
compose a household only to the extent that the ordinances require such 
households to remain nontransient, single-housekeeping units.”45  Had his 
opinion been the majority, it would have provided the basis for challenging 
restrictive zoning provisions throughout the country, in effect limiting, 
though not necessarily overturning, the Court’s decision in Belle Terre, 
which upheld a similar single family zoning restriction as it applied to 
 
 38. Id. at 520–21. 
 39. Id. at 520. 
 40. Id. 
 41. Id. at 519–21. 
 42. 416 U.S. 1 (1974). 
 43. Moore, 431 U.S. at 538–39 (Stewart, J., dissenting). 
 44. Id. at 520–21 (Stevens, J., concurring). 
 45. Id. at 519. 
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unrelated individuals.46  The ordinance in Belle Terre appeared to be aimed 
primarily at restricting the number of college students in the area;47 it would 
not have prevented Moore from living with her grandsons.48 
B.  Justice Powell’s Plurality Opinion 
In contrast, Justice Powell, joined by three other Justices, wrote a plurality 
opinion emphasizing the constitutional protection afforded families49 and 
grounding the definition of “families” in tradition.50  In subjecting the East 
Cleveland ordinance to greater scrutiny than that associated with a rational 
relationship test, the plurality shifted its emphasis away from property rights, 
where it viewed a rational relationship test as appropriate, and toward the 
intrusion on family.51  The Court observed that East Cleveland “has chosen 
to regulate the occupancy of its housing by slicing deeply into the family 
itself,”52 making it “a crime of a grandmother’s choice to live with her 
grandson in circumstances like those presented” in the case.53  The plurality 
opinion thus based its analysis on the Due Process Clause, holding that the 
“Court has long recognized that freedom of personal choice in matters of 
marriage and family life is one of the liberties protected by the Due Process 
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.”54  In turn, this analysis required the 
Court to provide a definition of the family to be accorded constitutional 
protection; the plurality adopted a conservative definition.55 
In articulating a notion of the family that justified constitutional protection, 
the plurality looked to tradition and observed that the extended family was at 
least as deeply rooted in tradition as the nuclear family, if not more so.56  The 
nuclear family, in contrast, was a recent development.57  The plurality then 
noted that “[e]ven if conditions of modern society have brought about a 
decline in extended family households,”58 it remains true that “[t]he tradition 
of uncles, aunts, cousins, and especially grandparents sharing a household 
along with parents and children has roots equally venerable and equally 
deserving of constitutional recognition.”59  The opinion found this tradition 
in “the accumulated wisdom of civilization, gained over the centuries and 
honored throughout our history, that supports a larger conception of the 
 
 46. Belle Terre, 416 U.S. at 1. 
 47. See id. 
 48. Moore, 431 U.S. at 519 n.15. 
 49. See generally Brief for Appellant, supra note 35. 
 50. Moore, 431 U.S. at 503–05 (plurality opinion). 
 51. Id. at 498–500. 
 52. Id. at 498. 
 53. Id. at 499. 
 54. Id. (quoting Cleveland Bd. of Educ. v. LaFleur, 414 U.S. 632, 639–40 (1974)). 
 55. Id. at 505. 
 56. Id. 
 57. Id. 
 58. Id. 
 59. Id. at 504. 
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family.”60  The Justices thus treated as commonplace the recognition of 
extended relatives as family and viewed the grandmother’s actions in taking 
in both of her grandchildren as admirable.  In doing so, the plurality adopted 
a normative vision of the family entitled to constitutional protection—a 
fundamentally different approach from Stevens’s modernist embrace of 
choice.  Accordingly, the Court acknowledged that affording constitutional 
protection to families required providing a substantive definition of what 
constituted a family.61  Moreover, the plurality did not question the ability of 
governmental authorities to define what they meant by family; the opinion 
simply required that the definition accept families determined by blood, 
adoption, and marriage. 
C.  Justice Stewart’s Dissent 
Justice Stewart’s dissent, joined by Justice William Rehnquist, sought both 
to narrow the definition of the family and to limit the constitutional protection 
accorded to such families.62  In doing so, it turned the plurality’s emphasis of 
the result’s arbitrariness on its head.  Stewart wrote that the 
interest that the appellant may have in permanently sharing a single kitchen 
and a suite of contiguous rooms with some of her relatives simply does not 
rise [to the level of a constitutionally protected interest].  To equate this 
interest with the fundamental decisions to marry and to bear and raise 
children is to extend the limited substantive contours of the Due Process 
Clause beyond recognition.63 
Stewart’s belittling comments, which assumed that Moore could simply have 
some of the family live in the other dwelling unit she owned in the same 
building,64 suggested that Stevens’s associational interests were not worthy 
of constitutional protection and that Moore’s choices about which relatives 
to invite into her residence had nothing to do with the definition of a 
constitutionally protected family.65  In short, the Constitution did not protect 
“choice” in the modernist sense at all. 
A fuller embrace of the idea of choice would come decades in the future.  
Consider, as a point in contrast, Justice Kennedy’s opening paragraph in 
Lawrence v. Texas,66 which struck down a statute criminalizing same-sex 
sodomy.  Justice Kennedy wrote: 
Liberty presumes an autonomy of self that includes freedom of thought, 
belief, expression, and certain intimate conduct.  The instant case involves 
 
 60. Id. at 505.  As a matter of constitutional jurisprudence, Moore and Michael H. v. 
Gerald D., 491 U.S. 110 (1989), are based on similar views of how to find the traditions 
protected by the Due Process Clause. 
 61. Moore, 431 U.S. at 503–05. 
 62. Id. at 531–41 (Stewart, J., dissenting). 
 63. Id. at 537. 
 64. Id. at 533 & n.4. 
 65. Id. at 537. 
 66. 539 U.S. 558 (2003). 
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liberty of the person both in its spatial and in its more transcendent 
dimensions.67 
Justice Stevens’s concurrence would be as close as the Moore Court would 
come to the modernist embrace of an individual right of self-definition.68 
III.  MOORE AND TWENTIETH-CENTURY 
FAMILY TRANSFORMATION 
The Moore opinion, in addition to its refusal to embrace the rhetoric of 
family choice, also skirted the substantive family transformation that was 
taking place in the latter part of the twentieth century.  That transformation 
involved a shift from marriage as part of a universal transition from 
adolescence into adulthood to family formation as a choice best made by 
those who have attained emotional maturity and financial independence.69  
The change required an embrace of contraception and, if necessary, abortion 
as critical to the postponement of childbearing, greater acceptance of 
nonmarital sexuality, and the redefinition of what had been gendered family 
roles.70 
Moore could have been cast in such terms.  Doing so, however, would have 
required shifting the focus from the grandmother, who is sympathetic under 
any definition of family values, to her two sons, the fathers of her 
grandchildren.  We know relatively little about the sons.  We know that the 
first son, Dale Sr., and his child, Dale Jr., were living with Moore before the 
case arose.71  Only when the second grandson, John Jr., joined the household 
did the family violate the East Cleveland ordinance.72  John Jr. came to live 
with Moore when his mother died.73  The opinion, however, tells us nothing 
about the circumstances.  These issues are irrelevant to the Supreme Court’s 
opinion in Moore—the Court addressed only the application of the East 
Cleveland ordinance to the grandmother’s decision to live with both of her 
grandchildren. 
Instead, Moore ties the extended family to a tradition that privatizes family 
support.  Moore is a homeowner, and there was no indication that she 
received public benefits to care for her grandchildren.  When her sons needed 
assistance with the care of their children, whether because of John Jr.’s 
mother’s death or their own financial needs, they turned to a family 
member—not the state—for assistance.  These factors make Moore part of a 
 
 67. Id. at 562. 
 68. The question of whether the Supreme Court has ever embraced a modernist definition 
of family formation as a matter of individual expression is complex.  For critiques of 
Lawrence, which unmoors its analysis from blood, marriage, and adoptions but still relies on 
traditionalist tropes of what an intimate relationship constitutes, see Katherine M. Franke, The 
Domesticated Liberty of Lawrence v. Texas, 104 COLUM. L. REV. 1399 (2004). 
 69. CAHN & CARBONE, supra note 2, at 20–22. 
 70. Id. at 19–46. 
 71. Moore v. City of East Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494, 533 (1977) (Stewart, J., dissenting). 
 72. Id. at 496–97 (plurality opinion). 
 73. Id. 
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long-standing tradition of neoliberal family support, and the Justices who join 
in the plurality opinion championing Moore’s position do so in precisely 
these terms. 
Justice Powell, writing for the plurality, had grounded constitutional 
protection of the family in its deep roots “in this Nation’s history and 
tradition.”74  He acknowledged that extended families had become less likely 
to live together but emphasized that they still came together in times of 
need.75  He treated the extended family as a fallback option, a form of 
insurance policy designed to protect the children from the failings of their 
parents.  This reasoning thus broke little new ground in the definition of the 
family. 
Justice William Brennan filed a concurrence, together with Justice 
Thurgood Marshall, that went further than the plurality in acknowledging the 
roots of family diversity.  The concurrence agreed with the plurality that the 
ordinance impermissibly infringed upon Moore’s choice of what constituted 
family and that the plurality’s acceptance of the extended family by blood 
had deeply embedded roots.76  Brennan, however, emphasized that the East 
Cleveland ordinance displayed “a depressing insensitivity toward the 
economic and emotional needs of a very large part of our society.”77  
Brennan’s concurrence linked the extended family to generations of 
immigrant families and to class and racial differences, noting: 
Even in husband and wife households, 13% of black families compared 
with 3% of white families include relatives under 18 years old, in addition 
to the couple’s own children.  In black households whose head is an elderly 
woman, as in this case, the contrast is even more striking:  48% of such 
black households, compared with 10% of counterpart white households, 
include related minor children not offspring of the head of the household.78 
The concurrence thus saw the East Cleveland ordinance as arbitrarily 
refusing to recognize not only a long-established family form but also a 
family form associated with poor and minority families and of continuing 
importance to those experiencing financial stress.79  In short, the extended 
 
 74. Id. at 503. 
 75. Id. at 505. 
 76. Id. at 511 (Brennan, J., concurring). 
 77. Id. at 508. 
 78. Id. at 509–10; see also Brief for Appellant, supra note 35, at 12. 
 79. Indeed, Brennan’s concurrence, which went further than the other opinions in 
endorsing the benefits of extended families, also saw extended families as a consequence of 
economic stress, observing: 
The “extended family” that provided generations of early Americans with social 
services and economic and emotional support in times of hardship, and was the 
beachhead for successive waves of immigrants who populated our cities, remains 
not merely still a pervasive living pattern, but under the goad of brutal economic 
necessity, a prominent pattern—virtually a means of survival—for large numbers of 
the poor and deprived minorities of our society.  For them compelled pooling of 
scant resources requires compelled sharing of a household. 
Id. at 508. 
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family is a consequence of compulsion rather than choice, and the conclusion 
of both the plurality opinion and the concurrence is that the ordinance is 
arbitrary, if not counterproductive.  The plurality, by grounding its analysis 
in tradition, could accordingly strike it down without influencing either the 
likely course of family evolution or the patterns of racial and economic 
segregation that affect American cities. 
The four dissenting Justices also faced a dilemma.  They, too, should have 
viewed Moore approvingly.  Yet, they wanted to preserve the ability of 
zoning boards to reinforce the links between property values and mainstream 
families, however the particular community defined them.  They therefore 
did not want to address the definition of family at all.80  These opinions, while 
sharing Stevens’s determination not to embed a definition of family in the 
Constitution, disagreed with his expansion of the constitutional rights of 
homeowners vis-à-vis the state and thus sought ways to allow the Court to 
look the other way.81 
The multiple opinions in Moore, while disagreeing sharply with each other 
in the framing of the issues and in their conclusions about the result, do not 
challenge the definition of what constitutes a family nor the ability of zoning 
authorities to define families and to channel82 appropriate residential 
behavior.  To the extent any of the opinions extended constitutional 
protection to families, they did so on the basis of blood ties rather than 
choice.83  The four Justices who joined the plurality opinion grounded their 
conclusion not only in tradition but also in the practicalities of a private 
system of family support.84  A grandmother who comes to the aid of her 
grandchildren, after all, vindicates both traditionalist and modernist family 
values.  Although Moore breaks new ground in protecting a grandmother 
from the vagaries of a local zoning ordinance, it does not fundamentally 
change the understandings of what constitutes a family—nor do much to 
restrict exclusionary zoning laws. 
 
 80. Id. at 521–22 (Burger, C.J., dissenting) (suggesting that the right solution was for 
Moore to seek a variance from the local zoning officials). 
 81. See, e.g., id. at 550–51 (White, J., dissenting) (adopting a deferential standard of 
review toward zoning ordinances).  In fact, many states have dealt with exclusionary zoning 
provisions in exactly this way, keeping such restrictions on the books and then backing down 
only in the face of determined (or embarrassing) opposition.  Such challenges, though, may be 
beyond the reach of financially stressed extended families. See Kent W. Bartholomew, 
Comment, The Definition of “Family” in Missouri Local Zoning Ordinances:  An Analysis of 
the Justifications for Restrictive Definitions, 52 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 631, 665–66 (2008). 
 82. See generally June Carbone, Out of the Channel and into the Swamp:  How Family 
Law Fails in a New Era of Class Division, 39 HOFSTRA L. REV. 859 (2011); Linda C. McClain, 
Love, Marriage, and the Baby Carriage:  Revisiting the Channelling Function of Family Law, 
28 CARDOZO L. REV. 2133 (2007); Carl E. Schneider, The Channelling Function in Family 
Law, 20 HOFSTRA L. REV. 495 (1992). 
 83. In this sense, Stevens’s opinion grounds its protection of Moore on her rights as a 
homeowner, not on a right extended to families per se. See supra Part II.A. 
 84. Moore, 431 U.S. at 505 (plurality opinion). 
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IV.  THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN FAMILY, CLASS, AND RACE:  
THE UNFINISHED DISCUSSION 
Moore is indubitably about the intersection of family, class, and race.  
Brennan’s concurrence observed that the nuclear family is a pattern 
associated with “white suburbia”85 and stressed that the “Constitution cannot 
be interpreted . . . to tolerate the imposition by government upon the rest of 
us of white suburbia’s preference in patterns of family living.”86  It 
documented the dramatically greater association of extended families in 
African-American communities than in white communities.  It also 
commented that this may reflect “the truism that black citizens, like 
generations of white immigrants before them, have been victims of economic 
and other disadvantages that would worsen if they were compelled to 
abandon extended, for nuclear, living patterns.”87 
None of the opinions acknowledge, however, the role of the changing 
family in exacerbating race and class disparities.  The plurality celebrated the 
traditional extended family without noting its association with marriage.88  In 
some communities, extended families permitted earlier marriages, with the 
new bride and groom moving in with their parents, or they contributed to the 
ability of working-class mothers to work outside the home or to care for 
elderly or disabled relatives.  And they have long served as the fallback 
helping to deal with the consequences of death or divorce.89 
By the late 1970s, however, extended families were also dealing with a 
national decline in marriage.90  Both better-off and poorer women had 
become more sexually active, and the importance of the shotgun marriage 
was decreasing for both.91  Ambitious women responded by embracing 
contraception and abortion, while working class women became more likely 
to give birth without marrying.  Extended families, especially in African-
American communities, were associated with “matrifocal families.”92 
This created a dilemma for zoning boards.  East Cleveland was a 
predominately African-American community, with an African-American 
city manager and city commission.93  Robert Burt observed that “the purpose 
of the ordinance was quite straightforward:  to exclude from a middle-class, 
predominantly black community, that saw itself as socially and economically 
upwardly mobile, other black families most characteristic of lower-class 
ghetto life.”94  This purpose does not make sense if extended families simply 
 
 85. Id. at 508 (Brennan, J., concurring). 
 86. Id. 
 87. Id. at 509. 
 88. Id. at 503–06 (plurality opinion). 
 89. JUNE CARBONE, FROM PARTNERS TO PARENTS:  THE SECOND REVOLUTION IN FAMILY 
LAW (2000). 
 90. See CAHN & CARBONE, supra note 2, at 19–32. 
 91. Id. at 34–37. 
 92. Burt, supra note 15, at 388. 
 93. Moore, 431 U.S. at 537 n.7 (Stewart, J., dissenting). 
 94. Burt, supra note 15, at 389. 
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served as fallback options for nuclear families experiencing hardships, such 
as the death of a child’s mother.  Instead, Burt emphasized that the problem 
with these extended families was not so much that they were 
multigenerational but that they were female headed and “disproportionately 
characteristic of black lower-income households.”95 
By adopting this ordinance, East Cleveland thus sought to preserve its 
middle-class character, not its racial character.  Moore may also have been 
trying to preserve her family’s middle-class status by including her 
grandchildren in the home she owned in a better part of town than may have 
been available to her sons if they sought to live with their children on their 
own.  Justice Stewart dismisses the importance of Moore’s interest in living 
in East Cleveland, describing the city as “an area with a radius of three miles 
and a population of 40,000” and suggesting that Moore could move with her 
grandchildren to some other part of town.96  Yet, none of the opinions tell us 
how easy that would have been, given the racial composition of the rest of 
the area, or how easy it would have been for Moore to sell her home or find 
a similar house she could afford elsewhere.  Moreover, moving would have 
almost certainly been disruptive for her and her grandchildren.97 
The fundamental socioeconomic question underlying the case involves the 
role of economic and racial segregation in limiting social mobility and 
compounding the effects that may be associated with family form.  Modern 
research indicates that, holding constant for other factors, some communities 
promote social mobility better than others.98  The communities that provide 
the greatest advantages have “lower rates of residential segregation by 
income and race, lower levels of income inequality, better schools, lower 
rates of violent crime, and a larger share of two-parent households.”99  
Moreover, children who move from less-advantaged to more-advantaged 
communities enjoy significant advantages even if their parents remain poor 
and they continue to live in single-parent families.100  Ironically, therefore, 
Moore had strong interests—to preserve the value of the property she owned 
and to provide a decent life for her grandchildren—in living in an area with 
more nuclear family households.  And East Cleveland, in turn, best served 
Moore’s interests by allowing her to remain without (again, ironically) 
attracting many more families like hers.101 
Given these realities, neither the Supreme Court nor the City of East 
Cleveland nor Moore had any good options in addressing this issue, and none 
 
 95. Id. at 388. 
 96. Moore, 431 U.S. at 550 (White, J., dissenting). 
 97. See William G. Austin, Relocation, Research, and Forensic Evaluation, Part I:  
Effects of Residential Mobility on Children of Divorce, 46 FAM. CT. REV. 137, 140 (2008) 
(demonstrating the harmful effects of residential mobility on children). 
 98. See generally CAHN & CARBONE, supra note 2. 
 99. CHETTY & HENDREN, supra note 12, at 7. 
 100. Id. 
 101. This is true so long as extended families in fact serve the role, as described in Justice 
Brennan’s plurality opinion, of providing a privatized way of dealing with family stress. 
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of the Moore opinions discuss the community effects underlying the case.  
The dissent wished to affirm the validity of local zoning laws without 
acknowledging the role such ordinances play in promoting racial and 
economic segregation.  The plurality wished to affirm the legitimacy of 
extended family households without acknowledging that a concentration of 
single-parent families tends to undermine community well-being.102  Justice 
Stevens, in giving homeowners a right to association without tying it to 
constitutional protection for families, penned the most radically 
individualistic opinion, elevating property rights over community efforts to 
enhance property values.  Yet, it seems closer in spirit to objections to the 
exercise of the power of eminent domain103 than to cases like Lawrence that 
grant a right of intimate association.  Considered in retrospect, Moore stands 
as a common sense invalidation of an arbitrary definition of single family 
applied to produce unsupportable results in the case of a sympathetic 
grandmother.  It has not contributed, however, to any greater appreciation of 
how the constitution of families104 interacts with the constitution of 
communities to determine societal well-being. 
CONCLUSION 
In the years after Moore, the cultural, racial, and economic divisions 
centered on the family have increased.  A large number of states have struck 
down restrictive zoning measures based on family form, while a significant 
number of other states have refused to do so.105  In 1979, less-traditional 
families were still largely associated with race; today, they have increasingly 
also become a marker of class as poor and working-class white families have 
adopted some of the same practices.106  A number of states, such as 
California, override local zoning laws to ensure that all communities include 
affordable housing, while other states have allowed racial and economic 
segregation to become more entrenched.107 
Today, as much as in 1979, there is no agreement about whether the 
relationship between the constitution of family and the constitution of 
community should involve a red embrace of established values in the public 
 
 102. This may be true for many reasons, including their association with poverty. 
 103. See, e.g., Kelo v. City of New London, 545 U.S. 469 (2005). 
 104. See Burt, supra note 15. 
 105. See Katia Brener, Note, Belle Terre and Single-Family Home Ordinances:  Judicial 
Perceptions of Local Government and the Presumption of Validity, 75 N.Y.U. L. REV. 447, 
454 (1999). 
 106. See generally JUNE CARBONE & NAOMI CAHN, MARRIAGE MARKETS: HOW 
INEQUALITY IS REMAKING THE AMERICAN FAMILY (2014); CHARLES MURRAY, COMING 
APART (2012). 
 107. See CAL. GOV’T CODE §§ 65580–65589.8 (West 2017) (requiring localities to meet 
their “fair share” of the need for housing at all income levels, specifically including the need 
for very low-, low-, and moderate-income housing); CHETTY & HENDREN, supra note 12 
(ranking municipalities in terms of their opportunities for social mobility). 
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square or a blue celebration of individual choice coupled with the 
construction of communities designed to support all of our children. 
 
